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This paper studies the relationship between trade liberalization and informality. It is often claimed that
increased foreign competition in developing countries leads to an expansion of the informal sector,
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examine the response of the informal sector to liberalization. In Brazil, we find no evidence of a
relationship between trade policy and informality. In Colombia, we do find evidence of such a
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1.  Introduction 
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s many Latin American economies drastically cut tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, and opened their markets to foreign competition. While this massive trade 
liberalization was celebrated as contributing to economic growth and efficiency, many have 
expressed fears that it may have widened the gap between the poor and rich in these countries. 
This paper focuses on one particular concern: that trade reforms led to a reallocation from the 
formal to informal sector (Stallings and Peres (2000)). The informal sector is conventionally 
defined as the sector of the economy that does not comply with labor market legislation and does 
not provide worker benefits.  It is primarily comprised of small firms. A broader definition 
includes temporary, or part-time workers employed in formal establishments. The size of the 
informal sector is significant in many developing countries; in Colombia, for example, it is 
estimated that 50-60% of the labor force are employed in the informal sector.  Because this 
sector is often identified with worse working conditions and lower job “quality”, a reallocation 
of employment from the formal to informal sector is considered undesirable.  Naturally, such 
claims are controversial.  To the extent that employment in the informal sector is voluntary and 
mainly sought by those placing a high value on flexible hours, informality is not necessarily an 
inferior option.   
We believe that a study of the impact of trade reforms on the informal sector is 
worthwhile for two reasons. First, despite the prominence of this question in public debate, there 
is hardly any empirical evidence linking increases in informal employment to trade policy – the 
only exception being a study by Currie and Harrison (1997) on Morocco that finds that firms 
started hiring more temporary workers after the completion of a comprehensive trade 
liberalization program. Second, we view this study as part of a larger effort to understand how 
the labor market in developing countries adjusts to trade reforms. In our earlier work on 
Colombia (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001), and Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2002)), we 
document that there is little labor reallocation across industries in the aftermath of trade reforms; 
in contrast, there is evidence that industry wages respond to trade liberalization in a manner 
consistent with the predictions of the specific factors model, or, alternatively, the loss of industry 
rents: wage premia decline in those industries in which the tariff cuts were largest.  The stability 
of industry employment shares is surprising. While such stability may be indicative of mobility 
costs and other labor market rigidities, an alternative explanation that we put forward in our   3
previous work is that the informal sector provides an additional margin of adjustment, possibly 
within industries.  In this paper we attempt a more rigorous investigation of this hypothesis. 
The usual argument that trade liberalization leads to a rise in informality goes something 
like follows:  Trade reforms expose formal establishments to increased foreign competition. In 
response, such establishments try to reduce labor costs by cutting worker benefits, replacing 
permanent workers with part-time labor, or subcontracting with establishments in the informal 
sector, including home-based and self-employed microenterpreneurs. Alternatively, firms in the 
formal sector may respond to the intensified competition from abroad by laying off workers who 
subsequently seek employment in the informal sector. 
From a theoretical point of view, the problem with this argument is that it immediately 
raises the question of why profit-maximizing firms had not switched to informal employment 
prior to the reforms in order to reduce costs. We start our analysis by presenting a theoretical 
model that can potentially be used to justify the view expressed above. Our theoretical discussion 
is based on the efficiency wage models considered in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bulow and 
Summers (1986), and the dynamic extension of these models discussed in Saint-Paul (1996). We 
use this framework to conduct comparative statics, and assess how permanent trade liberalization 
would alter the optimal share of informal employment. Consistent with the claims presented 
above, the model implies that trade liberalization should lead to an increase of informal 
employment.  
We should emphasize that we do not view the theoretical model we present as the only 
possible explanation for the existence of an informal sector. One can certainly write down 
alternative models (for example one in which wage differences across the formal and informal 
sectors represent compensating differentials), which would have different, possibly even 
opposite implications for the impact of trade reforms on informality. But such models would not 
represent the thinking of those who associate free trade with a larger informal sector. The 
purpose of our model is simply to capture this thinking, and present it in a logically consistent 
way. Put differently, the point of the theoretical analysis is to demonstrate that the view that trade 
reforms can lead to increased informality can be theoretically justified. Whether or not it is 
relevant in practice is however an empirical question, and to answer this question is the goal of 
the empirical part of our paper.  In the same spirit, we should also emphasize that our empirical 
analysis does not aim at “testing” the theory against alternative hypotheses. The objective is   4
rather to estimate the effects of trade liberalization on informality in order to assess whether the 
fears expressed above are justified. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on Colombia and Brazil, two countries that experienced 
major trade liberalization episodes in the last two decades. Both countries are characterized by 
the presence of a large informal sector.  Moreover, the proportion of workers employed in the 
informal sector has increased over time, peaking in the late 1990’s. It is this trend that has led 
some to believe that intensified foreign competition could be contributing to the rise in 
informality. 
Inferences based on this macroeconomic trend are however misleading for several 
reasons.  First, the trend may be due to the expansion of the non-tradable service sector, which is 
characterized by a larger share of informality. Second, it could partially reflect firms’ response to 
the recession of the late 1990’s.  More importantly, both Colombia and Brazil experienced a 
series of other reforms during the late 1980s and 1990’s; among them, the most notable ones 
concern changes in labor market regulation.  In Colombia, these reforms introduced more 
flexibility in labor markets, as they decreased firms’ hiring and firing costs, and very likely 
affected firms’ incentives to employ informal workers. In a series of papers, Kugler shows that 
the labor market deregulation in Colombia led to an increase in formal employment.  These 
results raise the concern that the partial overlap of labor market with trade reforms may prevent 
us from finding any effects of trade liberalization on informality, since the two sets of reforms 
are presumed to have opposite effects on the share of the informal sector (labor market reforms 
supposedly reduce informality, while trade reforms increase it).  
Fortunately, the nature of the trade reforms during this period is such that the effect of 
trade policy changes on informality can be identified off the cross-sectional variation of trade 
policy changes in our data. Trade liberalization in Colombia and Brazil did not just reduce 
protection rates, but also changed the structure of protection in these countries. One of the great 
advantages of focusing on Colombia and Brazil is that, because these countries were not 
members of the GATT or WTO prior to trade liberalization, they used tariff rates as the main 
trade policy instrument. Tariff rates are both well measured (relative to the non-tariff barriers 
traditionally employed in more developed economies), and comparable across time.  The trade 
reforms affected tariff rates differentially in different sectors. Sectors that had traditionally 
received high protection rates, such as textiles and apparel, experienced the largest tariff cuts. In   5
contrast, sectors with relatively low rates of protection experienced smaller tariff cuts. It is this 
differential rate of tariff declines across industries that we exploit in order to identify the effects 
of tariff changes on informality. A further advantage of focusing on countries that were not WTO 
members prior to the trade reforms, is that the usual concerns about the endogeneity of trade 
policy changes and political economy of protection are less pronounced here than in other 
studies. This is because the government’s objective when reducing tariff rates across industries is 
to achieve the uniform tariff rate negotiated with the WTO (in the case of Colombia, for 
example, this rate is 13%).  Policy makers are accordingly less concerned with catering to special 
lobby interests; as we demonstrate in our earlier work (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001) for 
Colombia, and Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2002) for Brazil), tariff declines in each 
industry are proportional to the industry’s pre-reform tariff level in 1983.  
The basic premise underlying our analysis is that mobility across the formal and informal 
sectors within an industry is greater than mobility across industries.  The descriptive statistics we 
present in the empirical section seem to support this premise; during the 1986-1998 period, 
approximately 88% of the change in the aggregate share of informal workers in Colombia (100% 
in Brazil) is accounted for by “within”, as opposed to “between-industry” shifts. The results of 
our earlier work concerning the stability of industry employment shares are also consistent with 
this view. To identify the effects of tariff changes in each country on the informal sector we 
relate changes in the likelihood of informal employment to tariff changes in each sector; thus, we 
only rely on within industry variation to identify the effects of the trade reforms on informality. 
This approach presumes that, while the effect of trade liberalization varied across industries, the 
effect of labor market reforms did not vary in a systematic way across industries. While this is 
certainly open to debate, we are not aware of any arguments or evidence that the effects of labor 
market reforms on informality varied across industries, or, more importantly, that they were 
systematically related to tariff cuts in each industry. 
To preview our results, we find little evidence that the informal sector was impacted by 
trade policy in any significant manner. For the case of Brazil, our attempts to link trade reforms 
to increases in informal employment have simply failed.  In Colombia, we find some weak 
evidence that in the early years of our sample, prior to the labor reform, trade liberalization 
contributed to an increase in informal employment in those sectors where the tariff cuts were 
largest. However, the effects are small. For the period following the labor reform, we again find   6
no link between trade and informality. These results suggest that trade policy is likely a second 
order concern compared to labor market legislation. Moreover, the trade policy effects are 
dependent on the labor market institutions.  When labor market rigidities are significant, as is the 
case with Colombia in the early years, firms are more likely to respond to intensified competition 
by reducing formal employment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model.  In section 3 we provide some background on Colombia and Brazil, and the trade reforms 
implemented in these two countries, and discuss our data sources. In section 4 we discuss the 
labor market institutions in the two countries and emphasize the differences that may account for 
the differences in our empirical results. Section 5 contains some descriptive results on 
informality, quality of work, and changes in informality over time and across and within 
industries.  Section 6 discusses our empirical results, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Trade and Informality:  Theory 
The first question our analysis needs to address is why firms keen to maximize profits had not 
made wider use of informal workers prior to the reforms, if such workers were indeed associated 
with lower labor costs. Saint-Paul’s (1994) dynamic efficiency wage model provides a possible 
justification for the simultaneous use of formal and informal workers, and is – in our view – best 
suited to describe and formalize the thinking underlying the argument that trade liberalization 
will lead to an increase in informality. 
  The basic structure of the models is as follows. Consider an infinite-horizon firm that 
faces uncertain demand. In each period, the firms’ revenue t R is given by: 
) ( t t t l f p R =  
where t p denotes the firm’s price in period t, f is a concave, increasing production function, 
and t l denotes the level of employment. The price t p is a random variable, with a cumulative 
density function  ), (p G  and  g G = ′ .  For expositional purposes we assume that the t p ’s are i.i.d. 
This assumption can however easily be relaxed to accommodate different degrees of persistence 
in the price shocks. Furthermore, we assume that the price shock in period  1 + t  is known at the 
end of period t, so that  1 + t l  is known one period ahead. This assumption is again made to 
facilitate exposition, but the results do not critically depend on it.   7
  The assumptions that are central to the analysis are the following: (1) The firm faces 
demand uncertainty.  (2) The firm can hire workers from two pools: a pool of formal, and a pool 
of informal workers; informal workers are defined broadly to encompass both part-time or 
temporary workers employed within a firm, and small firms and individuals who may 
subcontract with a formal firm. (3) The two pools differ in two important aspects: First, the 
employment of formal workers is regulated by labor market legislation; such workers receive 
benefits, cannot be dismissed unless the firm has accumulated sufficient evidence, and receive 
severance pay when dismissed.  This implies that the adjustment cost associated with the 
employment of such workers is higher compared to the employment of informal workers, which 
is not governed by any legislation.  Second, the effort of informal workers can be monitored 
perfectly, at some constant unit cost m . In contrast, the activities of formal workers cannot be 
monitored.  Note that this difference does not arise from any differences in the characteristics of 
formal and informal workers (though such differences, e.g., differences in skill, experience, etc., 
can be built-in into extensions of the model); formal and informal workers are assumed to be 
equivalent in every respect.  A potential justification for the difference in monitoring costs across 
formal and informal workers is the very existence of labor market regulation.  Because firms 
need to accumulate extensive evidence to justify firing formal workers, the cost of effectively 
monitoring such workers (to meet the standard dictated by unjust dismissal legislation) is 
substantial, so that firms may prefer to use alternative strategies to motivate such workers. 
  The model can be solved for the optimal shares of formal and informal workers. It can be 
shown that firms will generally find it optimal to simultaneously employ formal and informal 
workers.  The main steps in the solution are the following: 
 
a.  Wages and Labor Cost 
Consider the wage determination process first. Since informal workers can be monitored 
perfectly, they will be paid their reservation wage, R wI = , and the total cost of employing 
I
t l  




t l m w l c ) ( ) ( + =  
Next, consider the wages in the formal sector. Given that formal workers are not monitored, they 
will have incentives to shirk. To prevent shirking, the firm offers efficiency wages. Specifically,   8
the optimal wage for formal workers is determined by the familiar no-shirking condition that 
equalizes the expected utility associated with shirking, with the expected utility associated with 
no-shirking. It is easy to show that this condition ultimately leads to the following wage equation 
for formal workers: 
1 1 1
1 1 1











where δ  stands for the discount rate; xdenotes the probability of catching (and firing) a shirker; 
t φ is the probability that a worker loses her job for reasons other than shirking (with a uniform 
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= respectively. The above wage equation implies that the cost of employing 
F
t l formal 
workers in period t is: 
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There are two features of the results so far that are worth noting. First, wages in the formal sector 
are higher than in the informal sector, even though workers have the same qualifications. The 
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represents the rent to formality. The reason for this rent is that – in the 
absence of monitoring – firms need to penalize formal workers who shirk. Since the penalty from 
being caught shirking is losing one’s job, the existence of efficiency wages in the formal sector 
implies that workers who are fired, are made strictly worse off.  
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t l l > +1 ) is higher than the cost of not hiring. In particular, 








t l l ≤ +1 .  Put in a different 
way, efficiency wages introduce an adjustment cost, because the expectation of being fired raises 
the wage that needs to be paid to prevent workers from shirking. 
 
b.  The Firm’s Optimization Problem 
At the end of period t the firm decides how many formal and informal workers to employ in 
1 + t . The value of the firm is:   9




























Note that since the informal labor force 
I
t l does not have an influence on the value of the firm at 
the beginning of period  1 + t , the only state variable is 
F
t l .  The first order conditions 
characterizing the optimal solution are given by: 
FOC with respect to 
I
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= .  Given the kink in the labor cost function for formal 
workers, one needs to distinguish between three cases in deriving the FOC: 
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In this case the FOC is given by: 
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In this case the FOC is given by: 
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c.  The Optimal Shares of Formal and Informal Workers 
Given this structure, it can be shown that there exists a number l
~
such that the firm will employ 
at most l
~
formal workers. This number is determined by the equation 
m w b a l k I − − + = )
~
( δ ,   10
or equivalently
1: 
∫ ′ − = − − +
p
p
I dp p G l f m w b a ) ( )
~
( δ                                        (6) 
where  () / ( ) I p wmf l ′ =+ , and  () / ( ) I pwm b f l ′ =+ − .  The value l
~
has the following 
interpretation: If the firm has a number of formal workers that is less than l
~
, it will not start 
hiring informal workers until the employment of formal workers reaches the value l
~
.
2  When 
the firm has no informal workers, it operates as a purely formal firm. Vice versa, if the firm 
operates in a dual zone, employing both formal and informal workers, it will not start firing 




1 < + , then 0 1 = +
I
t l ). 
Whether or not the firm employs informal workers, depends on the value of the shock  1 + t p .  If 
the shock is large enough, the firm will find it profitable to expand into the informal sector.  Note 
that whenever the firm employs informal workers, the marginal product of labor is, according to 
(1), pinned down by the marginal cost of these workers ( m wI +  ) .  Hence, it does not depend 
on the current value of the shock  1 + t p .  This implies that a change in  1 + t p is met with a change 
in labor force, using informal workers as the adjustment margin, so that the marginal product 
remains constant and equal to  m wI +  .  The same logic implies that the informal workers are 
the first to go, when the firm is hit with a negative shock.  Formal workers are relatively 
sheltered from negative shocks; only when shocks are negative enough to prompt the firm to fire 
all its informal workers will formal workers be affected. 
 
d.  The Effects of Trade Liberalization 
We are now ready to analyze the effects of a reduction in trade barriers on the size of the 
informal sector.  The first question that arises is how such a reduction enters the model. One 
possible approach is to model trade liberalization as a negative price shock. As noted above, a 
straightforward implication of the dynamic efficiency wage model is that the firm would react by 
laying off its informal workers first, while keeping its formal work force intact. After all, this 
                                                 
1 The derivation is quite involved and can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 4 in Saint-Paul (1996). 
2 There is an implicit assumption underlying the following analysis that the unit cost of informal labor ( m wI + ) 
exceeds the minimum efficiency wage ( b a + ). Otherwise the firm would employ only informal workers.   11
flexibility to let the informal workers go when times are bad is central to explaining the existence 
of the informal sector.  Only if the shock is sufficiently negative, will formal workers be 
affected.  Empirically, we would then expect the share of formal workers in total employment to 
increase as the firm adjusts to the negative shock. 
This interpretation of trade liberalization is however unsatisfactory for two reasons.  First, 
the derived implication, namely that trade reforms lead to an increase in the share of employed 
formal workers, is exactly the opposite of what opponents of such reforms fear.  But the sole 
purpose of our model was to provide a justification for their claims based on economic theory.  
This goal is clearly not achieved if the analysis presented above yields the opposite conclusion. 
Second, the interpretation of the trade reforms in Brazil and Colombia as a one-time negative 
demand shock is inconsistent with the nature of these reforms.  The trade reforms were 
implemented as part of these countries’ entry into the WTO; therefore they were permanent. This 
suggests that a more appropriate interpretation of trade liberalization is as a process that leads to 
an increase in the cumulative distribution function  ) (p G .   
Specifically, we assume that the trade reforms lead to a new distribution function  ) (
* p G , 
such that  ) ( ) (
* p G p G > , for all  p . This implies that the expected value of  p is lower using 
) (
* p G  than  ) (p G : ) ( ) ( * p E p E G G < . We believe that this modeling approach accurately reflects 
the effects of a permanent decrease of trade barriers, as such a decrease leads to price declines in 
the affected industries. While prices remain volatile, they are expected to be on average lower 
once the trade reforms are implemented.   
  The effect of trade liberalization on the size of the informal sector can be derived by 
differentiating the right hand side of (6) with respect to  ) (p G . Remember that 
() / ( ) I p wmf l ′ =+ , and  () / ( ) I pwm b f l ′ =+ − . Differentiation of (6) yields: 
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Taking into account that  0 > b ,  , 0 ) ( > ′ l f   , 0 ) ( < ′ ′ l f  and that from (6) 
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, so that an increase in G will be matched by a lower value of l
~
. This is 
precisely the effect described in the verbal argument in the introduction: trade liberalization leads 
to a decline in the optimal number of formal workers, and an expansion of the informal sector.  
From (7), the larger b is, the larger the effect of the reforms on the optimal size of the formal 







= . Taking the probability of detecting and firing shirkers as a proxy for the 
severity of firing restrictions, the implication is then that the stricter labor market legislation is 
(that is, the smaller the probability of detection of shirking x is), the larger the impact of trade 
liberalization on reallocation from the formal to the informal sector will be. 
Note that the analysis above focused on the effects within representative firms of specific 
industries, thus ignoring general equilibrium effects. In the general equilibrium, the effects of 
trade policy on informality could potentially differ, as workers move from industries with large 
trade barrier reductions towards industries that are less affected by trade liberalization.  If the 
expanding industries were industries that typically employ a larger share of formal workers, then 
it is possible that trade liberalization would lead to an increase of formal employment in the 
aggregate. And vice versa, if the workers moved towards industries employing more informal 
workers (e.g., the service sector), we would have an increase in informality, which, however, 
would be driven by labor re-allocation across industries rather than the mechanism outlined 
above. While our theoretical discussion abstracts from such effects, in the empirical analysis we 
try to assess the importance of general equilibrium effects by decomposing changes in 
informality into “within” and “between” industry changes (see discussion in section 5). Our 
results suggest that in Brazil “within” industry shifts account for 88% of the changes in the share 
of informal workers, while in Colombia this number is close to 100%.  We therefore believe that 
general equilibrium effects, though in theory important, are in practice of secondary importance 
in explaining changes in informal employment.   13
We now turn to the empirical part of the analysis to examine whether the implications of 
this section are borne out in the data. 
 
3.  Data and Background  
3.1 Trade Policy 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil and Colombia implemented large trade liberalization 
programs.  Prior to the reforms, both countries followed import-substitution trade policies that 
protected domestic producers from foreign competition with high levels of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade (NTBs).  The degree of protection varied widely across industries.  For example, 
clothing faced tariffs of over 100% in Brazil in 1987 (over 90% in Colombia in 1984), while 
petrochemicals faced a 32% tariff in Brazil, and chemicals had a 26% tariff in Colombia in 
1984.
3  The pattern of protection suggests that Brazil and Colombia protected relatively 
unskilled-labor intensive industries; this corresponds to the pattern of protection reported for 
other Latin American countries (see for example Hanson and Harrison (1999) on Mexico).   
Brazil gradually liberalized its trade regime from 1988 to 1994.  Similarly, Colombia 
gradually reduced its trade barriers from 1984 to 1994, with the biggest tariff cuts occurring in 
1990 and 1991.
4  These liberalization episodes offer an excellent environment for studying the 
labor market adjustment to trade reforms for three main reasons.  First, the reforms significantly 
reduced the level of protection. This is evident in Tables 1a and 1b that report average tariff 
levels during the 1980s and 1990s for Brazil and Colombia, respectively.  The average tariff 
declined from 58.8% in 1987 to 15.4% in 1998 in Brazilian manufacturing.  Similarly, the 
average tariff declined from 27% to 10% between 1984 and 1998 in Colombia.  The declines in 
tariffs are lower in Colombia than in Brazil, because Brazilian tariff data include only 
manufacturing, while the Colombian data include non-manufacturing sectors with typically 
lower tariffs.  The bottom panel in table 1b shows that the average tariff in manufacturing 
                                                 
3 The source of tariff information for Colombia is the Colombian National Planning Department (DNP).  Tariffs are 
at the 2-digit ISIC level, which matches the level of industry aggregation in the Colombian household data.  See 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001) for details about the Colombian tariff data.  The source of the Brazilian trade data is 
Muendler (2002) at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~meundler/.  These data are based on Kume et.al. (2000).  The 
original data provide the tariff levels at the nivel 80 industrial classification.  We have aggregated the data to nivel 
50, and made some additional adjustments so that the tariff information corresponds to the level of industry 
aggregation in the Brazilian labor force data.  See Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2002) for details about the 
Brazilian tariff data.  
4 See Pavcnik and Goldberg (2001) and Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady (2002) for details about the exact 
timing of the reforms.   14
declined from 50% in 1984 to 13% in 1998 in Colombia, suggesting that the tariff declines in 
manufacturing are similar in Brazil and Colombia.  In addition to the drastic tariff reductions, 
both countries virtually eliminated NTBs.  In Colombia, the average coverage ratio declined 
from 72.2% in 1986 to 1.1% in 1992.  In our analysis, we focus on tariffs rather than NTBs, 
since tariffs are the primary trade policy instruments in these countries.  We consider the use of 
tariff data to be a strength of our approach.  Tariffs are much easier to measure and, unlike 
NTBs, comparable over time.
5  In addition, tariffs are positively correlated with NTBs in both 
countries over our sample period; hence, it is not the case that tariff declines are matched by 
increases in less transparent NTBs, as it happened in many developed economies in the 1980’s. 
A second advantage of focusing on the Brazilian and Colombian trade liberalization 
episodes is that both countries liberalized tariffs gradually, in the course of multiple trade 
liberalization rounds; therefore, our data provide (in addition to the cross-sectional variation) 
ample tariff variation over time that we can exploit for identification.   
Third, in addition to drastically lowering the level of protection, the trade reforms also 
altered the structure of protection across industries in both countries.  Figures 1a and 1b plot 
industry tariffs in 1998 against industry tariffs in 1986 in Brazil and 1984 in Colombia, 
respectively.  The figures show that the dispersion of tariffs was significantly reduced during the 
reform.  The low year-to year correlations of industry tariffs before and after the reform further 
suggest that the structure of protection has changed.  For example, the correlation between 
industry tariffs in 1986 (the beginning of our sample) and 1992 (the year after the major trade 
liberalization) in Colombia is .46.  Similarly, the correlation between tariffs in 1987 (the year 
prior to Brazilian trade reform) and 1995 (the year following the reform) is .6 in Brazil.  The 
changes in the structure of protection reflect Brazil’s and Colombia’s commitment to economy-
wide trade reforms to achieve the low tariffs negotiated with the WTO.  This commitment to 
economy-wide reforms limited the ability of interest groups to affect trade policy changes and 
translated into bigger tariff declines in industries with traditionally high levels of protection.  
Finally, these declines in trade protection were also mirrored in an increase in import penetration.  
                                                 
5 Detailed industry information on NTBs is not available for Brazil, and it is available for only 3 years for Colombia. 
We do not use NTBs for several reasons. First, NTBs are very difficult, if not impossible, to measure.  The anecdotal 
evidence suggests that while statistical agencies collecting NTB data make the data comparable across industries 
within a year, little effort is spent on making the data consistent across years.  This complicates the use of time-
series data on NTBs.  Second, in our empirical framework we control for changes in imports, which partially 
accounts for the effects of changes in NTBs.  Finally, unlike in many developed countries, tariffs have always been 
the main policy instrument in Brazil and Colombia.     15
Import penetration increased from around 20% in 1984 to over 30% in manufacturing in 
Colombia; in Brazil, it grew from 5.7% in 1987 to 11.6% in 1998.  It is interesting to note that 
although trade liberalization almost doubled import penetration in Brazil, Brazilian firms 
continue to be exposed to significantly lower import penetration than their Colombian 
counterparts.   
 
3.2 Labor Force Data 
We link the data on trade exposure to labor force data on individual workers.  For Brazil, 
we use information from the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), collected by the Brazilian 
Statistical Bureau over 12 years, from 1987 to 1998.  The data cover the 6 largest metropolitan 
areas so that our results are representative of the urban labor markets.  We focus on individuals 
in the age range of 15-65, who work full time (defined as working more than 25 hours per week) 
in manufacturing. Using the survey information, we create several variables that control for 
worker characteristics such as age, gender, education, geographic location, informal sector of 
employment, self-employment, industry affiliation, and wage.  We match the PME industry 
codes with tariff codes, which yields 20 manufacturing industries per year and 240 industry-year 
observations.  Our hourly wage measure is created by dividing monthly wage by 4 times the 
reported number of hours worked in a given week.  Based on completed years of education, we 
classify workers into those with no complete education, complete elementary education, 
complete lower secondary education, complete secondary education, and complete university 
education. 
Most importantly, the PME contains information on whether a worker has “carta 
assinada”, a signed work card, which enables us to distinguish between workers employed in the 
formal and informal sectors.  In Brazil, workers employed by an employer complying with labor 
market legislation have the terms of their employment contract written in their work card, 
“cartiera de trabalho”.  A worker with a signed work card is entitled to several benefits and 
rights.  Workers without a signed work card are considered to be working in the informal sector.  
Based on this information, we create an indicator for informality. 
    For Colombia, we use labor force data from the June waves of the Colombian National 
Household Survey (NHS), which is administered bi-annually by the Colombian National 
Statistical Agency (DANE). Our data cover urban areas in the years 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992,   16
1994, 1996, and 1998. We construct several variables that control for worker demographics and 
employment characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, family background, education, 
literacy, occupation, industry of employment, geographical location, and hourly wage.  We also 
create controls for whether an individual works for a private company, government, or a private 
household, and whether he/she is an employer or self-employed.  Industry codes are reported at 
the 2-digit ISIC level, yielding 33 industries per year.
6  Hourly wages are constructed based on 
the information on the reported earnings and the number of hours worked normally in a week.  
Based on the information on highest completed grade, we classify workers into those with no 
complete schooling, complete primary school, complete secondary school, and complete 
university degree. Furthermore, the June waves of the NHS contain information on whether the 
worker’s employer pays social security taxes.  The employer’s compliance with the social 
security legislation (and thus labor market regulation) provides an excellent indicator for whether 
a worker is employed in the formal sector.    
The main disadvantage of our individual worker data is that we do not have information 
on unionization.  This may not be that problematic in the case of Colombia. Edwards (1999) plus 
anecdotal evidence suggest that unions do not have significant power in most Colombian 
industries (public sector and the petroleum industry are an exception).  Unions may potentially 
have more power in Brazil where about 37% of manufacturing workers belong to the union 
(Arbache and Carneiro (2000)).  We address this potential problem in our empirical work.   
 
4.  Labor Market Regulation  
Our theoretical discussion in section 2 suggests that the effects of trade liberalization on 
informality may depend on the labor market institutions.  In this section we briefly describe the 
labor market reforms undertaken by Brazil and Colombia during our sample period and contrast 
the labor market flexibility in the two countries. 
                                                 
6 Our tariff data provide information on 21 industries.  Some of the industry-year cells contain very few worker 
observations after we split the sample into formal and informal workers.  Therefore, we explore the robustness of 
our results when we exclude these industries.  These industries are forestry (ISIC 12) fishing (13), coal mining (21) 
metal ore mining (23), other mining (29), and international and other extra-territorial bodies (96).     17
Let us first focus on Colombia. The Colombian labor market is highly regulated and 
formal firms face large dismissal costs when they fire a worker for “unjust” reasons.
7  In order to 
increase the labor market flexibility, Colombia implemented a labor market reform in 1990 (Law 
50 of December 1990).  Kugler (1999), Kugler and Cardenas (1999) and Edwards (1999) provide 
compelling evidence that this reform significantly lowered the cost of firing a worker in several 
ways.  In addition, the reform increased the flexibility of fixed-term contracts and expedited the 
process of mass layoffs.  Overall, these changes are believed to have increased the flexibility of 
the Colombian labor market.  In fact, the empirical work by Kugler (1999) and Kugler and 
Cardenas (1999) finds that the increased labor market flexibility following the reform induced 
higher labor market turnover in Colombia.  In particular, the reduction in the dismissal cost is 
associated with a decline in average tenure and an increase in employment exit rates that are 
larger in the formal sector (that was directly affected by the reform) than in the informal sector 
(that was not affected by the reform).   
Brazil also undertook a labor market reform in 1988.  Paes de Barros, Corseuil, and Bahia 
(2000) describe the changes in detail.  In contrast to the Colombian reforms, the Brazilian 
reforms are believed to have decreased the flexibility of the Brazilian labor market.  However, 
the empirical work on the impact of these reforms on firm turnover by Paes de Barros, Corseuil, 
and Bahia (2000) finds little robust evidence that the increase in the dismissal costs had a 
significant impact on employment exit rates.   
The differences in the response to the labor market reforms in Brazil and Colombia are 
not surprising.  A study by Heckman and Pages (2000) on labor market regulation in Latin 
America suggests that the labor market is substantially more regulated in Colombia than in 
Brazil.  In particular, the paper provides evidence that the expected cost of dismissing a worker is 
much higher in Colombia than in Brazil, even after Colombia’s 1990 labor market reform.  The 
expected cost of dismissing a worker was about .9 of the monthly wage in Brazil and about 6.1 
monthly wages in Colombia at the end of the 1980s.  The expected cost of dismissing a worker 
amounted to 1.8 monthly salaries in Brazil and 3.5 monthly salaries in Colombia at the end of the 
1990s.  Given the lower firing costs in Brazil, Brazilian formal firms may have had significant 
more flexibility in firing relative to their Colombian counterparts before and after the labor 
                                                 
7 According to Kugler and Cardenas (1999), the only cases in which employers did not have to pay dismissal costs 
were when employees were fired “because of undue care, sabotage, or release of the employers’ proprietary 
information (page 7)”.   18
reform.  Hence we would expect the effects of trade policy on informality to vary across the two 
countries; moreover, the effects may also differ depending on whether we focus on the pre-, or 
post-labor-reform period in Colombia. We explore these differences in our empirical work in 
section 6.   
 
5.   Informality and trade: Some preliminary evidence 
Our distinction between a formal and informal sector in Brazil and Colombia is based on 
compliance with labor market regulation.  Since the selection of workers into the informal sector 
is obviously not random, we first check how worker characteristics differ across the two sectors.  
Table 2 summarizes worker characteristics in the formal and informal sectors for Colombia in 
1994.
8  Informal workers are more likely to be male, older, less educated, and illiterate. 
Furthermore, informal workers are also more likely to be single, albeit more likely to be head of 
the household.
9  These differences in the demographic composition of the labor force across the 
informal and formal sectors highlight the importance of controlling for individual worker 
characteristics in our empirical analysis rather than relying on industry data.   
Informal and formal workers also differ in their job characteristics.  In particular, it is 
often claimed that informal jobs are associated with lower job quality. This claim, controversial 
as it is, is of particular interest to those studying the effects of trade on inequality. If trade 
liberalization induces a shift to the informal sector, and if this sector offers “worse” jobs, then 
trade would have contributed to inequality, whereas inequality is here broadly defined as the 
difference between those with “good” and those with “bad” jobs. 
We can get a rough idea about the job characteristics in the informal sector by analyzing 
information from the 1994 June wave of the Colombian National Household Survey. In this year, 
the survey contains a special module on the Quality of Employment.   In particular, the survey 
provides information on how workers view the workplace conditions, job characteristics, and 
employee relations.  For each of these questions, we create an indicator that is one if the 
respondent evaluates the conditions as excellent or good, and 0 if the worker evaluates the 
                                                 
8 We focus our discussion on 1994 because the 1994 survey contains a special module on the quality of 
employment. Descriptive statistics on worker demographics for other years yield similar findings, except that in 
some years informal workers appear to be younger than formal workers (although the age differences are in all cases 
very small).  In Brazil, informal workers are also less educated and more likely to be men, but they are younger than 
their informal counterparts. 
9This second finding is a bit surprising.  Our regression results later reveal that conditional on other characteristics, 
head of the households are less likely to be informal workers.   19
conditions as average or bad.  In addition, workers also provide information on whether they 
receive benefits and job training.   
Table 2 provides survey means of the job characteristics of formal and informal workers. 
The overall impression is that work in the informal sector is considered less satisfying. Several 
differences between the responses of formal and informal workers are worth noting.  First, 
formal workers are more likely to be satisfied with the job characteristics, workplace conditions, 
and employee relations.  Second, formal jobs are associated with significantly more benefits than 
informal positions.  In particular, formal workers are much more likely than informal workers to 
receive individual benefits such as health coverage, dental coverage, vacations, incentive 
bonuses, maternity leave, unemployment benefits and pensions, sick leave, transportation 
benefits, insurance, and family subsidy.  Overall, 83% of informal workers report receiving no 
benefits through their job – this number is only 4% for formal workers.  Formal workers are also 
more likely to receive on the job training than informal workers.  Finally, informal jobs are 
associated with a higher degree of uncertainty about employment duration.   
Informal workers are more likely to hold temporary positions than formal workers.  This, 
however, could be considered a benefit of informality, reflecting the flexibility of informal labor 
market arrangements. Table 2 reveals that the two groups do no differ much in the average 
normal hours worked in a given week, though the variance of hours worked is bigger in the 
informal sector.  In addition, while there is no difference in average hours worked across the 
formal and informal sectors for men (average hours worked is 50.6 and 50.9 respectively), 
women in the informal sector work on average 2 hours less per week than women in the formal 
sector (46.2 and 44.3, respectively).  Lower average hours for women in the informal sector, and 
higher dispersion of hours worked for all informal workers, indicate that the informal sector 
provides a more flexible arrangement. Overall, this descriptive evidence suggests that 
informality is associated with lower job and workplace satisfaction, very few benefits, lower 
incidence of job training, and higher uncertainty about duration of employment.  However, 
informality is also associated with more flexibility in the job arrangement.   
We next turn to the question of whether trade liberalization has contributed to the 
incidence of informal employment in Brazil and Colombia. Tables 3a and 3b report the 
aggregate shares of informal workers during our sample for the two countries.  The incidence of 
informal employment increased from .1 in 1987 to .2 in 1998 in Brazilian manufacturing   20
industries.  The aggregate share of informal workers does not increase over time in Colombia.
10  
However, given that different sectors were exposed to differential trade shocks, aggregate data 
could potentially mask industry level changes.   
In addition, the tables suggest that the probability of informal employment is higher in 
Colombia than in Brazil.  However, the Colombian figures also include the non-manufacturing 
sectors with higher shares of informal workers.  Column 2 of table 3b reports the aggregate share 
of informal workers in manufacturing sectors for Colombia.  These figures confirm that 
informality is more widespread in Colombia than in Brazil.  Overall, 48% of all manufacturing 
workers work in the informal sector.  Moreover, the share of informal workers has increased 
over time also in Colombian manufacturing.  The difference in the share of informal workers in 
Brazil and Colombia is not surprising. Kugler’s (1999) model predicts that the lower the cost of 
dismissing a worker, the higher the compliance with labor market legislation (in other words, the 
higher the share of the formal sector).  Since Colombian firms face a more rigid labor market and 
higher cost of dismissing a worker than Brazilian firms they less incentive to comply with labor 
market regulation.   
Naturally, the question arises whether these changes in informality stem from changes in 
the composition of industry employment (i.e., trade liberalization may have expanded the 
employment in industries that employ a proportionally larger share of informal workers) or from 
within industry changes in informal employment (i.e., within an industry, workers move from 
formal to informal jobs).  Several pieces of evidence suggest that the within industry movements 
from formal to informal jobs dominate.  To begin with, in our previous work on Colombia and 
Brazil (see Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2002) and Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady 
(2002)) we found that industry shares in total employment do not vary much over time during 
our sample period.  If trade policy changes had led to reallocation of resources across industries, 
we would expect low year-to-year correlations of industry shares in total employment.  However, 
the correlation between the 1986 and 1998 shares is .99 in Colombia, while in Brazil the 
correlation between the 1987 and 1998 shares is .96.  Moreover, if most of the increase in 
informality stemmed from changes in the composition of employment across industries with 
                                                 
10 The data suggest that the aggregate informality share is lower in 1994 than in other years.  This is a bit puzzling.  
The comparison of the means of other worker characteristics for 1994 and other years suggests that the 1994 data 
have similar means of other worker characteristics as the 1992 and 1996 survey (see table 1d in Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2001)).  Moreover, the means of the characteristics of the formal and informal workers in 1994 are not 
very different from those in other years.     21
different informality intensities, we would expect a large positive correlation between changes in 
the industry shares in total employment and industry informality intensity.  However, regressing 
the change in the industry share in total employment between 1998 and 1987 on the share of 
informal workers in industry employment in 1987
11 does not reveal such a strong positive 
correlation.  The coefficient of the share of informal workers is .047 (p-value .07) in Brazil, and -
.004 (p-value .33) in Colombia.   
Most importantly, a decomposition of the change in the share of the informal workers 
into changes that occurred within industries and the changes that occurred across industries 
indicates that most of the increase in informality stems from movements of workers from formal 
to informal jobs within industries.  In particular, we decompose the change in the share of 
informal workers in total employment between 1998 and 1987 (1986 in Colombia)  I ∆ into 
within and between industry shifts, respectively:  .. tt j t j j t j
jj
I II i E E i τ ∆= − = ∆ + ∆ ∑ ∑ , where Ejt 
is the share of industry j's employment in total employment at time t, ijt is the share of informal 
workers in total employment in industry j,  . .5( ) jj t j EE E τ = + , and  . .5( ) jj t j ii i τ = + .
12  Table 3c 
presents the results.  88% of the increase in the informal employment in Brazil stems from 
movement of workers from formal to informal jobs within industries.  In Colombia, within- 
industry movements of workers account for almost all of the increase in the informal 
employment.  In fact, the negative sign on the between-industry shift suggests that the small 
shifts in the employment across industries would actually lead to a decline in informal 
employment.  In sum, the evidence indicates that the mobility of workers across the formal and 
informal sectors within an industry is greater than the mobility of workers across industries.
13  
As a result, our empirical work in the next section focuses on explaining whether trade 
liberalization is associated with these within industry shifts in informality. 
This preliminary evidence suggests that if trade policy had any effects on the incidence of 
informal work in Brazil and Colombia at all, such effects would have operated through changes 
                                                 
11 In Colombia, we use 1986, the first year of our sample. 
12 This decomposition has been often used in the literature on skill-upgrading to decompose the change in the share 
of skilled workers between and within industries. 
13 Obviously, given that we do not have very disaggregated industry data (especially in the case of Colombia), some 
of the movements within industries could actually represent changes in composition of employment across more 
detailed industry categories.  In fact, in Brazil where industry classification is more detailed, movements across 
industries do account for a larger share of the informality increase than in Colombia.  However, the within industry 
movements continue to dominate.   22
in the composition of formal and informal sectors within industries.  However, many other 
factors such as labor market reforms and macroeconomic conditions may be influencing the 
aggregate trends.  In the next section, we rely on detailed micro level data on worker 
characteristics and industry panel data on tariffs to study the association between tariffs and 
informality more formally. 
 
6.  Informal employment and trade policy 
6.1  Empirical Methodology 
We relate trade policy to the probability of working in the informal sector by employing a 
two-step estimation approach that has been used in the labor literature on wage premia.  In the 
first stage, we use a linear probability model and regress the indicator Yijt for whether a worker i 
employed in industry j at time t works in the informal sector on a vector of worker characteristics 
Hijt, such as age, age squared, education indicators, gender, geographic location, and a set of 
industry indicators Iijt indicating worker i’s industry affiliation: 
* ijt ijt Ht ijt jt ijt YH I i p β ε =+ +      (8) 
The coefficient on the industry dummy ipj captures the part of the variation in informal 
employment that cannot be explained by worker characteristics, but can be explained by 
workers’ industry affiliation. We call these coefficients industry informality differentials.
14  We 
express the estimated informality differentials as deviations from the employment-weighted 
average informality differential (ipj).
15  This normalized informality differential can be 
interpreted as the percentage point difference in probability of informal employment for a worker 
in a given industry relative to an average worker in all industries with the same observable 
characteristics.  The normalized informality differentials and their standard errors are calculated 
using the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted least squares procedure 
provided to us by John P. Haisken-DeNew and Christoph M. Schmidt.
16  The first stage 
                                                 
14 In addition to the linear probability model, we have computed industry informality differentials using a probit.  
The two specifications yield similar marginal industry effects.  The correlation between industry informality 
differentials based on the linear probability model and the probit is over .8 for Brazil and Colombia.  We thus 
continue to use the linear probability model.   
15 The sum of the employment weighted normalized informality differentials is zero. 
16 Haisken DeNew and Schmidt (1997) adjust the variance covariance matrix of the normalized industry indicators 
to yield an exact standard error for the normalized coefficients. The adjustment of the variance covariance matrix 
occurs by taking into account the linear restriction that the employment-share weighted sum of the normalized 
coefficients is zero.     23
regressions are estimated separately for each year in our sample.  In the second stage, we pool 
the industry informality differentials ipj over time and regress them on trade related industry 
characteristics: 
jt jt T jt D jt ip T D u β β =+ +       (9) 
where Tjt is a vector of trade exposure measures such as tariffs, imports, and exports and Djt is a 
vector of industry and time indicators.  Because our dependent variable in the second stage is 
estimated, we estimate (9) with weighted least squares (WLS), using the inverse of the variance 
of the informality estimates from the first stage as weights.  This puts more weight on industries 
with smaller variance in informality differentials.  We also account for general forms of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term in (9) by computing robust (Huber-
White) standard errors clustered by industry. 
 
6.2  First Stage Results 
  Prior to discussing the relationship between trade policy and the probability of working in 
the informal sector, we provide some information on the first stage results.  Tables 4a and 4b 
report the coefficients on the individual characteristics that are associated with working in the 
informal sector in selected years for Brazil and Colombia, respectively.  The results suggest that 
younger workers are more likely to work in the informal sector.  In Colombia, women and the 
more educated workers are less likely to work in the informal sector.  In Brazil, we also 
persistently find that workers with complete university degree are less likely to work in the 
informal sector, but the coefficients on the complete elementary, lower secondary, and secondary 
education are usually statistically insignificant.  Moreover, unlike in Colombia, women are more 
likely to participate in informal work.  In Colombia, we also control for household characteristics 
that may affect a person’s propensity to work in the informal sector such as whether a person is 
married, head of the household, the number of children in a household aged 0-4, number of 
inactive adults in a household, and earnings of other household members.  The results in table 4b 
suggest that married individuals and household heads are more likely to work in the formal 
sector.  Moreover, workers living in households with children aged 0-4 are more likely to work 
in the informal sector (albeit the coefficient is not always significant).  Surprisingly, the 
coefficient on the interaction of a female indicator with the number of children is insignificant.    24
Finally, workers living in households with higher income of other household members are less 
likely to work in the informal sector.  
Second, in both Brazil and Colombia, industry indicators in the first stage are always 
jointly statistically significant, and most of them are also individually statistically different from 
zero.  This suggests that even conditional on worker characteristics, industry affiliation is an 
important determinant of the probability of working in the informal sector.  In particular, in 
Brazil, workers employed in clothing, manufacture of wood and wood products, and oil 
extraction are more likely to be employed in the informal sector than workers with the same 
observable characteristics in other industries.  In Colombia, workers are more likely to work in 
the informal sector if they are employed in the manufacture of wood and wood products, 
agriculture, restaurants and hotels, and household services.  Finally, the industry informality 
differentials are highly correlated over time in Brazil.  Almost all year-to-year correlations are 
above .9.  For example, the correlation between 1987 and 1988 industry informality differentials 
is .98 and the correlation between 1987 and 1995 informality differentials is .96 (1995 is the year 
following the end of trade liberalization in Brazil).  However, the year-to-year correlations 
between informality differentials are lower in Colombia, ranging from .6 to .95.
17  For example, 
the correlation between 1986 and 1990 informality differentials is .92.  However, the correlation 
between 1986, the first year of our sample and 1994, the year that follows the period of dramatic 
trade liberalizations is .71.  High year-to-year correlations of industry informality differentials in 
Brazil suggest that trade policy changes are unlikely to be associated with changes in the 
informal employment.  However, the lower correlation coefficients in informality differentials in 
Colombia suggest that trade policy could at least in principle affect the incidence of informal 
employment in this country. 
 
6.3  Second Stage Results:  Industry Informality Differentials and Trade Policy 
  In the second stage, we relate industry informality differentials to trade policy (tariffs in 
particular) as suggested in equation (9).
18  Note that controlling for individual worker 
characteristics in the first stage eliminates some of the potential estimation biases in the 
                                                 
17 Correlations for Colombia are based on computations that exclude industries with few observations.  Those 
industries have very noisy measures of industry informality differentials and thus make these correlations even 
lower. 
18 A 20% tariff is denoted in our data as .2.   25
relationship between informality and tariffs stemming from differences in worker composition 
across industries.  For example, if industries with a higher share of unskilled workers receive 
higher trade protection and unskilled workers are more likely to work in the informal sector, 
reliance on industry level data could potentially yield a spurious positive relationship between 
informality and trade policy.  Since we control for worker characteristics in the first stage (and 
thus control for industry composition each year), our second stage results are not driven by 
differences in worker composition across sectors.  Moreover, all second stage regressions include 
industry fixed effects and year indicators.  Inclusion of these controls additionally reduces the 
potential estimation biases.  For example, business cycle fluctuations might independently 
impact tariff formation and the probability of informal employment.  If government raises tariffs 
during recessions and workers move from the formal to the informal sector, the tariff coefficient 
could be biased upward.  Similarly, to the extent that labor market reforms of 1988 in Brazil and 
1990 in Colombia had similar affects across all industries (conditional on controlling for industry 
composition in the first stage), year indicators capture their effects.  Finally, industry fixed 
effects control for unobserved industry characteristics that are time-invariant. Such controls are 
important, since unobserved industry attributes, such as an industry’s ability to form a lobby, 
industry productivity, or capital intensity may simultaneously affect industry tariff formation and 
industry informal employment.  For example, less productive industries may be more effective at 
lobbying the government for higher tariffs and also employ relatively more informal workers.    
The results for Brazil are reported in Table 5a.  The table reports the coefficients on each 
independent variable and p-values associated with the coefficients.  Column 1 reports the results 
from the regression of industry informality differentials on tariffs, industry indicators, and year 
indicators.  The coefficient on tariff in column 1 is small in magnitude and insignificantly 
different from zero.  This suggests that there is no statistical relationship between tariffs and 
probability of working in the informal sector.  Although tariffs are our preferred way of 
measuring an industry’s exposure to trade because they capture the direct effect of policy on 
informality, we also experiment with other measure of exposure to trade (such as imports and 
exports) commonly used in trade studies.  The use of these variables is not motivated by trade 
theory, and we consider these regressions mostly as a robustness check on our estimates of the 
tariff coefficients.  In particular, in column 2, we add lagged import penetration and lagged   26
export orientation as regressors.
19  The inclusion of additional regressors does not change the 
magnitude or the significance of the tariff coefficient.  Moreover, the coefficient on import 
penetration is insignificant.  However, the coefficient on export orientation is positive and 
significant.   
Trade reforms in Brazil were accompanied by significant exchange rate fluctuations.  
These currency fluctuations could differentially impact employment in traded and non-traded 
sectors.  For example, an exchange rate appreciation is likely to lead to an expansion of the non-
tradable sector, which in general employs a higher share of informal workers (though this effect 
is less relevant in our Brazilian data, which contain only manufacturing industries).  Note 
however, that if exchange rate fluctuations were driving our results, we would expect most of the 
increase in aggregate informality to stem from reallocation of employment across industries.  
Yet, the results reported in section 5 suggest that most of the changes in aggregate informality 
are due to within industry changes. Accordingly, the focus in our empirical work is on 
investigating whether these within industry changes in informality are associated with variation 
in industry tariffs.  Nevertheless, to be confident that our results are robust to controlling for 
exchange rate fluctuations we also estimate a specification in which we interact lagged import 
penetration and lagged export orientation with the exchange rate.
20  The results are reported in 
column 3 of Table 5a.  The inclusion of the exchange rate interaction does not affect either the 
magnitude or the significance of the tariff coefficient.
21  Finally, in columns 4, 5, and 6 we also 
estimate the relationship in first differences and obtain no significant relationship between trade 
reform and probability of informal employment for Brazil.   
The above analysis suffers from three potential problems.  First, the 1988 labor reform 
may have affected the relationship between trade policy and informality.  Unfortunately, we do 
not have sufficient data prior to the labor reform to explore whether the relationship between 
trade policy and informality has changed after the reform.  However, our prior is that this is not a 
big issue.  Heckman and Pages (2000) suggest that the labor market in Brazil was substantially 
less regulated than in Colombia.  In addition, we find that year-to-year correlations of industry 
                                                 
19 We use lagged values because trade flows are a function of factor prices.  Of course, to the extent that trade flows 
are serially correlated, our approach does not fully eliminate the simultaneity bias. 
20 We use the nominal exchange rate (real/$US) from Muendler (2002).  We do not use the nominal effective 
exchange rate from IMF because it is only available since 1992. 
21 Note that the year effects already control for the economy-wide effect of exchange rates (that does not vary across 
industries). The interaction terms are meant to capture the possibility that exchange rate fluctuations have different 
effects depending on a sector’s import or export orientation.   27
informality differentials are extremely high, and that the differentials are very similar in 
magnitude before and after the 1988 labor reform.  This limits the scope for important 
interactions of labor market with trade reforms.  Nevertheless, to be sure, we also repeat our 
previous analysis using only the years in our sample after the labor market reform (i.e., from 
1989 onwards).  The results are reported in Table 5b, in the same order as the results in Table 5a, 
and lead to the same conclusions.   
The second potential problem with our analysis is that we cannot control for union 
membership in the first stage of our estimation.  If industry union power affects both the 
probability of informal employment and tariff formation, our results could be biased.  To the 
extent that union power in each industry has not changed over time in Brazil, industry fixed 
effects would capture union effects.  This may in fact be a realistic assumption.  Arbache and 
Carneiro (2000) report the shares of unionized workers in various manufacturing industries in 
1992 and 1995, and show that the shares are relatively stable over time.
22   
Finally, the lack of significant relationship between the changes in informal employment 
and contemporaneous tariff changes might not be surprising if firms respond to trade reform with 
a lag.  In order to explore this possibility, we estimate specifications in which we use one-year 
lagged tariffs (and tariff changes) rather than the contemporaneous tariffs (and tariff changes) as 
the explanatory variable.  The results are presented in Table 5c in the same order as the results in 
Table 5a.  We continue to find no association between tariff changes and changes in the share of 
informal employment.  In sum, our analysis suggests no relationship between trade reform and 
the incidence of informal employment in Brazil.
23 
Table 6a presents the results for Colombia.  The tariff coefficient in column 1 is negative 
and significant, which suggests that tariff declines are associated with increases in informal 
employment.  In particular, a 1-percentage point decline in a tariff in a given industry is 
                                                 
22 They use data from PNAD.  During the trade liberalization of the early 1990s, these data are only available for 
1991 and 1994; the surveys for 1989 and 1990 do not contain information on union status. 
23 In unreported regressions, we have also estimated the relationship between probability of informal employment 
and tariffs by pooling worker level data over all years and including tariffs and year indicators directly in the first 
stage in equation 8.  We adjusted standard errors to reflect that tariffs vary over time and across industries only.  As 
expected, we continue to find no association between tariffs and probability of informal employment, as in our two-
stage approach.  Note, however, that the one-stage estimation does not allow us to explore the relationship between 
informality and tariffs in first differences because we do not have repeated observations on the same individual 
across years.  In these one-stage regressions, we have also allowed the effect of tariffs to vary across skilled and 
unskilled workers (where skilled workers are defined as those with complete secondary or university education).  
We find some suggestive evidence that relative to skilled workers, declines in tariffs are associated with increased 
probability of informal employment for unskilled workers.      28
associated with a .1 percentage point (i.e. .001) increase in the probability of informal 
employment.  This would translate into a 4-percentage point increase in the probability of 
informal employment in an industry that experienced a 40-percentage point decline in tariffs.  
These effects seem relatively small in magnitude.  In column 2, we add lagged imports and 
exports as our regressors.
24  The addition of these controls barely changes the magnitude of the 
tariff coefficient, but the coefficient is now less precisely estimated.  Moreover, the positive and 
significant coefficient on imports suggests that increased import competition is associated with 
higher probability of informal employment, while increases in industry export orientation are 
associated with declines in probability of informal employment. As in Brazil, the Colombian 
trade reforms were accompanied by large exchange rate fluctuations.  But just as in Brazil, most 
of the increase in informality in Colombia can be attributed to within industry changes rather 
than reallocation across industries.  We do not believe that exchange rate fluctuations are driving 
the association between within industry changes in informality and changes in industry tariffs.  
Nevertheless, we formally check the robustness of our tariff coefficient by estimating a 
specification in which we interact lagged imports and exports with the exchange rate.
25  The 
results are presented in column 3.  The inclusion of the exchange rate interactions hardly changes 
the coefficient on tariffs.  Finally, we also estimate the relationship between informality and 
trade policy in first differences.  The results are reported in columns 4, 5 and 6.  The results on 
tariffs are not robust to first differencing:  the coefficients on tariffs are no longer statistically 
different from zero.  However, the results for imports and exports are robust. 
The next three tables report several robustness checks.  As pointed out in section 3.2, 
some of the industry-informality-year cells do not contain many observations.  In Table 6b, we 
repeat our analysis excluding industries with very few workers (see data description on which 
industries are excluded).  This yields similar results to those obtained in Table 6a.  Moreover, 
given that the incidence of informality was unusually small in 1994, we have also repeated our 
analysis without 1994.  These results are reported in Table 6c and yield similar findings as Table 
6a.  Finally, as in the case of Brazil, we check whether it takes time for firms to adjust informal 
employment to trade reform by exploring the relationship between informality and lagged 
                                                 
24 Unlike in Brazil, we cannot use import penetration and export orientation measures because we do not have output 
data for non-manufacturing industries. 
25 The exchange rate we use is the nominal effective exchange rate from the IMF.   29
tariffs.
26  The results are reported in Table 6d in the same order as in Table 6a.  All the 
coefficients are well within the 95% confidence interval of the coefficients on contemporaneous 
tariffs reported in Table 6a.
27   
  We next turn our attention to the labor reform.  As discussed in section 4, Colombia 
underwent a large labor market reform in 1990.  This reform significantly reduced the cost of 
firing a worker and increased the labor market turnover.  As a result, the reform may have 
affected the relationship between trade policy and informality.  The model in section 2 suggests 
that high firing costs make monitoring of formal workers extremely costly, so that the probability 
of establishing shirking is low. Reducing firing costs effectively increases the probability of 
detecting and responding to shirking.  This in turn implies that the response of the informal 
sector to trade liberalization will be less pronounced if the trade reform is accompanied by 
changes in the labor market regulation that decrease firing costs (see also the discussion in 
section 2d). To explore this possibility, we allow the relationship between tariffs and informality 
to vary across the pre- and post-1990 reform years; in particular, we interact tariffs with an 
indicator that is 1 after the 1990 labor market reform, and zero otherwise.  The results are 
presented in table 7. 
  Two interesting results emerge. First, the coefficient on tariffs is negative in all columns.  
This suggests that a tariff decline in an industry is associated with an increase in the probability 
of informal employment prior to the labor reform, when the costs of firing formal workers were 
high.  Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction of tariff with the labor market reform indicator 
is always positive.  This suggests that a tariff decline in an industry is associated with a smaller 
increase (and potentially an overall decrease) in the probability of informal employment after the 
reform.  The bottom of the table reports the p-value from the test that there is no statistical 
association between tariffs and informality after the labor market reform.  We either fail to reject 
                                                 
26 Because of data availability, we use two-year lags in tariffs. 
27 As in the case of Brazil, in unreported regressions we have also estimated the relationship between probability of 
informal employment and tariffs by pooling worker level data over all years and including tariffs and year indicators 
directly into first stage equation 8.  As expected, this yielded similar findings to our two-stage estimation results.  
Note that we cannot estimate this specification in first differences because we do not observe the same individuals 
over time.  Moreover, in some of these specifications, we also allowed the coefficient on tariffs to differ across 
skilled and unskilled workers (where skilled workers are defined as those with complete secondary or university 
degree).  We found that tariffs do not impact the probability of informal employment differentially across the two 
groups.   30
the hypothesis (columns 1, 3, 5, and 6), or find a small, positive relationship between tariffs and 
informality after the labor market reform (column 2 and 4).   
To summarize, we find no relationship between tariff declines and increases in informal 
employment in Brazil, while this relationship is estimated to be positive, but small, in Colombia 
prior to labor market reforms. The differences between the findings for Brazil and Colombia, as 
well as the differences between the pre- and post-labor-reform Colombia, are indicative of the 
importance of labor market institutions, and can be interpreted within our model.  The model 
suggests that the response of informality to trade liberalization depends on the likelihood of 
catching and firing shirkers, which in turn is affected by labor market legislation. Since 
Colombia is more regulated than Brazil, and pre-reform Colombia in particular had the highest 
firing costs in our sample, our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
  This paper has investigated the relationship between trade policy and the informal sector.   
Our empirical work does not find significant evidence that the trade reforms contributed to 
increases in informal employment in Brazil and Colombia.  For Brazil, in particular, we find no 
relationship between trade liberalization and informality.  For Colombia, we find that tariff 
declines are associated with an increase in informal employment in the industries with the largest 
tariff cuts, but only in the period before the labor market reform. Even in this case, the magnitude 
of the effect is small.  These results suggest that compared to labor market rigidities, trade policy 
is of secondary importance in determining the incidence of informal employment. 
Our work points to the significance of labor market institutions when studying the effects 
of trade reforms.  The differences in the relationship between informality and trade policy 
between Colombia and Brazil, and the differences in the response in Colombia before and after 
the labor market reform indicate that labor market institutions play an important role in how 
trade reform affects informal employment. Firms are more likely to respond to increased 
exposure to foreign competition through reductions in formal employment, when they operate in 
rigid labor markets.  A similar conclusion is reached by Aghion, Burgess, and Redding (2002), in 
a study of the impact of trade reforms on growth of Indian states subject to different labor market 
regulation.  Given that many Latin American countries underwent large trade liberalizations 
during the 1980s and 1990s, and that labor markets in these economies exhibit different degrees   31
of flexibility, studying the interaction of labor and trade reforms in these economies remains a 
fruitful topic for future research. 
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Note: The line is 45 degree line.  The numbers are industry symbols (they do not match across 














Note: There are 20 industries in each 
year.  Table 1b--Tariffs in Colombia 1984-1998
Year N Mean S.D.
All Industries
1984 21 27.4 24.8
1985 21 22.2 16.7
1988 21 20.7 16.0
1990 21 17.5 14.0
1992 21 10.6 4.1
1994 21 9.7 4.8
1996 21 9.8 5.1
1998 21 9.9 5.1
Manufacturing
1984 9 49.8 19.0
1985 9 36.6 9.5
1988 9 33.5 11.1
1990 9 29.1 9.1
1992 9 12.9 3.4
1994 9 12.9 3.6
1996 9 13.0 3.9
1998 9 13.1 3.8
Note: There are 21 industries overall and 9 
manufacturing industries.  Source: Authors' 
calculations based on tariff data provided by DNP.Table 2--Informal and Formal Workers Colombia 1994
Informal Formal
Individual Characteristics




No complete schooling  0.174 0.065
Elementary school complete 0.536 0.389
Secondary school complete 0.217 0.397
University complete 0.073 0.148
Married 0.330 0.386
Family background
Head of the household 0.477 0.447
Number of kids in a household (hh) 0.447 0.402
Number of inactive adults in a hh 1.215 1.226
Earnings of other hh members 1586.3 1782.7
Job characteristics
Work in 11 or more person establishment 0.206 0.753
Excellent or good job characteristics 0.861 0.922
Excellent or good workplace conditions 0.869 0.930
Excellent or good employee relations 0.891 0.948
Health benefits 0.099 0.796
Dental benefits 0.074 0.686
Vacation 0.111 0.829
Incentive bonuses 0.111 0.841
Maternity leave 0.026 0.271
Unemployment benefits/pension 0.099 0.783
Sick leave 0.034 0.273
Transportation benefit 0.064 0.543
Family subsidy 0.033 0.428
Receive no benefits 0.830 0.044
Job training  0.169 0.364
Permanent position 0.771 0.865






















Average .57 .48Table 3c--Decomposition of Changes in Informal Employment
Total Within Industry  Between Industries
Brazil .104 .092 .012
Colombia .012 .020 -.008
Colombia--manufacturing only .073 .075 -.002T
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